






Antitrust "extraterritoriality" is the rage. In the past two years the debate
over U.S. antitrust jurisdiction has intensified on three fronts, in each case
focusing on ways to ameliorate what is perceived as being the impermissibly
broad scope of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction in the context of foreign conduct.
In the courts, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals have taken unmistakably conflicting positions on
the propriety of various "interest-balancing" approaches to regulating the
application of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign conduct.' Within and without
the American Law Institute, disagreement over the jurisdictional provisions
of the proposed revisions to the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
continues to delay the Restatement's adoption. 2 And lastly, in the Con-
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thank Rick Sevcik and Jonathan D. Kron, associates at Bell, Boyd & Lloyd, as well as Spencer
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preparation of this article.
tSee Sennett & Gavil, Extraterritorial Conduct Issue Ripe for Review, Legal Times of
Washington, Mar. 18, 1985, at 17, col. 1, for an earlier, abbreviated version of portions of this
article.
1. Contrast Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984) ("Laker Airways") with Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3895 (U.S. June 24, 1985) (No. 84-1761) (Justices White
and Blackmun dissented indicating that they would have granted the petition) ("Timberlane
III"). The designation of the Timberlane cases as "Timberlane I, 1I, & III," representing the
initial Court of Appeals decision, the District Court decision on remand and the Court of
Appeals decision following remand, is a convention adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane
III and followed here to avoid confusion.
2. See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) (Tent.
Draft No. 6, April 12, 1985) ("RESTATEMENT (REVISED)"); ALI Defers Consideration of Draft
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No.
1217, at 935 (May 30, 1985).
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gress, consideration of a legislative solution to the issues raised by the
conflict in the courts is rapidly progressing. 3
The debate in all three forums proceeds from the assumption that the
traditional "effects" doctrine 4 fosters considerable friction between the
U.S. and its trading partners by subjecting a wide variety of foreign conduct
to the U.S. antitrust laws.5 To alleviate that friction, courts and commenta-
tors have proposed the adoption of an interest-balancing approach that
would require courts to consider a laundry list of factors to determine
whether as a matter of "international comity and fairness" it would be
appropriate under the facts of a given case to exercise antitrust jurisdiction
over a controversy based on foreign conduct.6
Part I of this article reviews the present status of interest-balancing in the
courts, in the American Law Institute's latest proposed revisions to the
Restatement and in Congress. Section A briefly examines efforts by the
courts since the Uranium litigation 7 to implement variations of that interest-
balancing analysis, focusing in particular on the recent Laker Airways case
and the Ninth Circuit's most recent Timberlane decision. Section B focuses
on the development of the Restatement and explores its approach to interest
analysis and its use of "prescriptive jurisdiction" as a concept that encom-
3. S. 397, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. 1160-63 (Feb. 6, 1985). Hearings before the
Senate Judiciary Committee commenced in late June and the Antitrust Section of the American
Bar Association has filed a task force report qualifiedly endorsing the bill. ABA Antitrust Law
Section Endorses Most of Bill on Extraterritoriality, [Jan-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 1219, at 1022 (June 13, 1985).
4. The effects doctrine holds that U.S. antitrust jurisdiction can extend to foreign conduct
that "affects" U.S. commerce and generally has been traced to United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) ("Alcoa"). For a good discussion of the development of
the effects doctrine in the courts, see 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD, 147-56 (2d ed. 1981).
5. For a sampling of foreign criticism of the reach of U.S. antitrust laws, see Pengilley,
Extraterritorial Effects of United States Commercial and Antitrust Legislation: A View From
"Down Under," 16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 833 (1983); Pettit & Styles, The International
Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 697
(1982); Debate, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law (Economic Imperialism or
Protecting Competition Against Foreign Invasion?), 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 617 (1982); Hacking,
The Increasing Extraterritorial Impact of U.S. Laws: A Cause for Concern Amongst Friends of
America, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1 (1979). See also PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS (J. Griffin ed. 1979); 1 ATWOOD & BREWSTER,
supra note 4, at 100-05; 1 W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 92-97 (3d
ed. 1982); RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 403, reporters' note 1; Symposium- Transnational Litiga-
tion-Part I1: Perspectives from the U.S. and Abroad, 18 INT'L LAW. 773-803 (1984); Robinson,
Compelling Discovery and Evidence in International Litigation, 18 INT'L LAW. 533 (1984).
6. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979)
("Mannington Mills"); RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 403(2).
7. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979); 1 ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 4,
at 169-73.
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passes the power of courts to determine cases or controversies. Lastly,
section C analyzes S. 397, introduced in February of this year, which
attempts to codify a modified interest-balancing approach that would re-
quire U.S. courts to dismiss antitrust actions when the court determines that
the interests of the United States in enforcement are outweighed by the
interests of adversely affected foreign nations. 8
Part II more closely analyzes the various criticisms that have been leveled
at interest balancing in the context of the two foci of the interest-balancing
debate: (1) whether courts acting within the federal system unilaterally can
adopt interest-balancing as a tool to temper the allegedly harsh reach of
U.S. antitrust jurisdiction; and (2) whether the courts or Congress, regard-
less of their power to do so, should implement interest-balancing as a
solution to the perceived problem of overbroad U.S. antitrust jurisdiction.
Part III concludes that the controversy over U.S. antitrust jurisdiction
began as a political and diplomatic dialogue and should remain as such.
Interest-balancing not only raises serious constitutional questions but is
unwise as a policy matter and likely to generate more conflict than it
resolves. Plunging courts into the arena of foreign affairs in the context of
threshold jurisdictional inquiries can only lead to the further politicization
of the judicial process and should be avoided. Comity considerations may,
however, inform the courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction and serve as
useful guidelines throughout the course of litigation.
I. Interest Balancing in the Courts, Restatement and Congress
A. DISAGREEMENT GROWS IN THE COURTS
1. The Timberlane Cases
The Timberlane case 9 arose out of an American lumber company's unsuc-
cessful efforts to establish a base of operations in Honduras for purposes of
milling and exporting Honduran lumber to the United States. In the early
1970s Timberlane Lumber Company, an Oregon partnership engaged in the
wholesale distribution of lumber in the United States, ventured to Honduras
in search of new sources of lumber to import into the United States.
Through two Honduran corporations principally owned by Timberlane's
general partners, the company set out to purchase Honduran lumber, to be
milled in Honduras and thereafter shipped to the United States. Although
8. The bill would, in part, amend the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-290. § 402, 96 Stat. 1233, 1246-47 (1982) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a).
9. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n, 549 F.2d
597 (9th Cir. 1976) ("Timberlane I"); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America National
Trust & Savings Ass'n, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ("Timberlane 11").
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Timberlane's original plans called for the construction of a new milling
facility in Honduras, it instead purchased a substantial interest in an existing
lumber mill that had previously been owned by the Lima family, one of three
principal groups involved in milling lumber in Honduras at that time.
Although the mill had experienced substantial financial difficulties and had
ceased operation, Timberlane sought to revive it as an ongoing business.
At the time the mill was purchased by Timberlane, the Lima enterprise
remained heavily indebted to the Bank of America National Trust and
Savings Association, a wholly-owned Honduran subsidiary of the Bank of
America. The bank also had substantial financial interests in the two com-
peting Honduran lumber milling enterprises. Timberlane alleged that the
two Honduran competitors and the bank conspired to eliminate Lima and
later Timberlane from the production and export of Honduran lumber, in
part by refusing to refinance the Lima mill's debt or to sell the bank's
interests in the mill to Timberlane. Instead, the bank transferred its claims
to Lima's competitors, apparently for nominal consideration, who there-
after proceeded to use the Honduran courts and other means to force
closure of Timberlane's operations. In 1973, Timberlane filed a federal
action and a California state unfair competition suit based on the conduct
undertaken in Honduras.10
Timberlane I came before the Ninth Circuit in 1976 following the district
court's dismissal of Timberlane's action based on the act of state doctrine
and for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed on
both grounds."1 With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit
found that the lower court had erred by looking only at whether the chal-
lenged conduct had a "direct and substantial effect" on U.S. foreign
commerce. 12 As an alternative, the court outlined what has now become
well-known as the Timberlane tripartite test:
[Tihe problem should be approached in three parts: Does the alleged restraint
affect, or was it intended to affect, the foreign commerce of the United States? Is it
of such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation of the Sherman
10. Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 603-05; Timberlane II, 574 F. Supp. at 1455-59.
11. The court found the act of state doctrine inapplicable, since the "acts" in question were
Honduran court orders prompted by private litigation. Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 605-08. See
also Note, Judicial Balancing of Foreign Policy Considerations: Comity and Errors Under the
Act of State Doctrine, 35 STAN. L. REV. 327 (1983). The defendants apparently did not argue for
extraterritorial application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which insulates court petitioning
activity from antitrust attack under certain circumstances. See generally United States Depart-
ment of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations 62-63 (1977); 1 ATWOOD &
BREWSTER, supra note 4, at 256-59; Hawk, Act of State Doctrine, Noerr-Pennington Abroad and
Foreign Government Compulsion Defense, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 987, 1000-01 (1978); Coastal
States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1364-67 (5th Cir. 1983). For a brief review of the
Revised Restatement's provisions concerning the act of state doctrine and foreign government
compulsion, see Fugate, Antitrust Aspects of the Revised Restatement of Foreign Relations Law,
25 VA. J. INT'L L. 49, 65-71 (1984).
12. Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 610.
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Act? As a matter of international comity and fairness, should the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the United States be asserted to cover it? 13
On remand, the lower court permitted extensive discovery and concluded
once again in Timberlane H that the action should be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 14
On appeal following remand, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the court's
dismissal of Timberlane's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
though it criticized the district court for failing to address directly the
Timberlane I factors.' 5 Citing Timberlane rs tripartite test, the court of
appeals posed the first issue as "[djoes the alleged restraint affect, or was it
intended to affect, the foreign commerce of the United States?" Quoting
Timberlane I, the court held that this first prong of the test requires only
"'that there be some effect-actual or intended-on American foreign
commerce before the federal courts may legitimately exercise subject mat-
ter jurisdiction under [the antitrust] statutes.' , 6 In order to avoid the need
to resolve factual issues going to the merits of Timberlane's claims, the
Ninth Circuit accepted plaintiff's allegations of anticompetitive effects in
U.S. markets, finding that Timberlane had met this de minimis requirement.
Second, the court considered whether the conduct challenged was of
"'such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation of the
Sherman Act?"' The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that this second
prong of Timberlane I requires "a showing of a 'direct and substantial' effect
on the foreign commerce of the United States.' 7 According to the court,
the only issue under this portion of its test is "whether the magnitude of the
effect identified in the first part of the test rises to the level of a civil antitrust
violation, i.e., conduct that has a direct and substantial anticompetitive
effect." Stated somewhat more accurately, did Timberlane allege effects
"'sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and,
therefore, a civil violation of the antitrust laws? ,18 Again, the Ninth Circuit
had no difficulty finding this second prong to have been satisfied by the
allegations of Timberlane's complaint. 19
13. Id. at 615.
14. Timberlane II, 574 F. Supp. at 1460.
15. Timberlane III, 749 F.2d at 1383 & n.3. The District Court found, and the Court of
Appeals agreed, that the defendants' motion was properly treated as one to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than as a Rule 56 motion for summary
judgment, despite the extensive record that had been generated through discovery and the
extensive conclusions of fact which the court drew in order to resolve the "jurisdictional"
question. Timberlane II, 574 F. Supp. at 1460-61; Timberlane III, 749 F.2d at 1381-82.
16. Timberlane III, 749 F.2d at 1383. Viewed in isolation, the court's treatment of this "first
prong" would seem to be inconsistent with Sherman Act section 7's direct, substantial and
reasonably foreseeable effect standard. 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
17. Timberlane III, 749 F.2d at 1383, quoting Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 613.
18. Timberlane Il, 749 F.2d at 1383.
19. Id.
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With respect to the third prong of the Timberlane tripartite test, whether
"'[a]s a matter of international comity and fairness. . . the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the United States [should] be asserted to cover"' the chal-
lenged conduct,2 ° the Ninth Circuit instructed that Timberlane I requires
consideration of the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the
nationality of the parties and their principal places of business if corpora-
tions, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to
achieve compliance, the relative significance of the activity's effects on the
U.S. as compared to other states, the presence of an explicit purpose to
harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such an effect, and
the situs of the conduct principally giving rise to the violation. 21 The court of
appeals undertook its own review of the record evidence with respect to
each of these factors, arguing that it was free on appeal to determine for
itself controverted fact issues arising under the third prong of the Timber-
lane test since, in its view, resolution of a "policy judgment" under Rule
12(b)(1) "need not directly implicate the merits of the case." 22
Finding that all but two of the seven factors disfavored the exercise of
jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
Timberlane's action. It is clear from the court's considerations, however,
that its decision was based in large part on the mere fact of conflict with
foreign law and the relative significance of the effects on United States
foreign commerce as compared with the effects on the Honduran economy.
Thus, the court concluded that application of U.S. antitrust law to the
conduct in question would create "a potential conflict with the Honduran
government's effort to foster a particular type of business climate.",23 With-
out stating any rationale or apparent justification for its conclusion, the
court of appeals held that such a clear conflict of law or policy, "unless
outweighed by other factors in the comity analysis, is itself a sufficient
reason to decline the exercise of jurisdiction over this dispute." 24
The court also concluded that "[t]he insignificance of the effect on the
foreign commerce of the United States when compared with the substantial
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1384-85.
22. Id. at 1382.
23. Id. at 1384. According to Timberlane's complaint, the defendants' actions included
bribery of court officials, violence and the securing of perjured testimony. Timberlane 11, 574 F.
Supp. at 1459. It is certainly questionable whether the encouragement of such a "business
climate" was the "policy" of Honduras and, even if it was, whether a U.S. court should so
casually surrender its jurisdiction to avoid interfering with the implementation of such a
"policy." Indeed, one of the factors listed in the Revised Restatement is the degree to which
regulation of the conduct challenged under the domestic law is generally accepted outside of the
United States. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 403(2)(c). It would seem appropriate to apply the
same standard to the foreign law or policy to which deference is urged.
24. Timberlane III, 749 F.2d at 1384.
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effect in Honduras suggests federal jurisdiction should not be exercised." 25
This conclusion apparently rested upon the court's resolution of conflicting
evidence indicating that Honduran lumber accounted for at most between
three percent and four percent of total U.S. imports.2 6 Arguably then, the
Ninth Circuit may have reached the proper conclusion, but for the wrong
reasons and with some violence to Rule 56.27
2. The Laker Case
In Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,28 the District of
Columbia Circuit unambiguously rejected the use of Timberlane-style in-
terest balancing early last year, holding that "[a]bsent an explicit directive
from Congress, this court has neither the authority nor the institutional
resources to weigh the policy and political factors that must be evaluated
when resolving competing claims of jurisdiction.", 29 In so holding, the D.C.
Circuit affirmed the district court's assertion of jurisdiction and its entry of a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants, Belgian and Dutch air-
lines, from joining in a British suit instituted by two British airlines, also
defendants in the U.S. action, against the plaintiff seeking to enjoin it from
proceeding with its antitrust claims in the United States. 30
The saga of Laker Airways began with the introduction by Sir Freddie
Laker of "no-frills" air passage between the United States and the United
Kingdom in 1977. It was alleged that in response to Laker's low priced
transatlantic fares, the members of the International Air Transport Associa-
tion (IATA), a trade association of the world's largest air carriers that
"substantially controlled" the prices for scheduled transatlantic air service,
conspired to drive Sir Freddie from the market for transatlantic air service.
Perceiving Laker's operations "as a threat to their system of cartelized
prices," these members of IATA allegedly agreed to a schedule of pred-
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1385. In so holding, however, the court made numerous conclusions about the
relevant markets and the impact of the defendants' actions without the benefit of a full trial
record. Although purporting to act under Rule 12(b)(1), the propriety of resolving disputed
fact questions based on such a preliminary record highlights a serious flaw in the balancing
approach.
27. This may have been responsible for the Supreme Court's denial of Timberlane's petition
for a writ of certiorari.
28. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd.,
[198413 W.L.R. 413; Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 1985-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 66,390 (D.D.C. 1984). For a post-decision discussion of the Laker case by the author
of the decision, see Wilkey, United States of America, in Symposium on Transnational Litiga-
tion-Part 11: Perspectives from the U.S. and Abroad, 18 INT'L LAW. 779 (1984).
29. 731 F.2d at 955.
30. In July 1984, several months after the D.C. Circuit reached its decision, the House of
Lords declined to enjoin Laker from proceeding with its American suit, acknowledging that the
U.S. courts were appropriately exercising their jurisdiction under principles of international
law. British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413.
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atorily low fares with the intention of driving Laker out of business. They
also were alleged to have paid secret commissions to travel agents who
diverted customers from Laker, to have agreed to raise prices following
Laker's demise and to have blocked Laker's attempt to reorganize. After
reaching its peak in 1981, allegedly carrying one out of every seven passen-
gers between the United States and the United Kingdom, Laker was forced
into liquidation in early February 1982. 3'
The principal issue before the court on appeal concerned the propriety of
the "antisuit injunction" issued by the district court, prohibiting Sabena and
KLM from joining in the British action and from initiating any action on
their own for similar relief anywhere else in the world.32 In a thorough
presentation of the principles of jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct,33
Judge Wilkey, in the lengthy majority opinion, found that the lower court's
issuance of the injunction was justified in order to protect the court's
jurisdiction and on public policy grounds. 34 The court then rejected the
arguments of appellants, KLM and Sabena, that the-district court's injunc-
tion should be reversed based on considerations of international comity and
fairness.
Initially, KLM and Sabena argued that the district court's injunction itself
should not have issued in light of principles of comity. KLM and Sabena thus
asserted that the antisuit injunction offended British interests as reflected in
the antisuit injunction issued by the British courts limiting Laker's ability to
proceed with its U.S. antitrust suit. 35 Accepting the underlying premise of
the appellants' position, the court noted that the "central precept" of comity
teaches that, "when possible, the decisions of foreign tribunals should be
given effect in domestic courts. ,36 Where the foreign act is "inherently
31. 731 F.2d at 916-17.
32. For a detailed review of the procedural history of the Laker dispute, see 731 F.2d at
917-21. Interestingly, Judge Starr dissented, arguing that the district court's injunction was
unjustifiably broad in light of considerations of comity, because it prohibited KLM and Sabena
from seeking redress from Laker's action in any court in the world. The dissent would have
remanded for consideration of a narrower injunction, limited only to the courts of the U.K. Id.
at 957-58 (Starr, J., dissenting). For the majority's response, see id. at 942-45.
33. The court criticized the convention of referring to "extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust law" as inaccurate and misleading. If extraterritorial conduct has the requisite effect
on U.S. commerce, the exercise of federal jurisdiction is not, strictly speaking, "an extraterrito-
rial assertion of jurisdiction." 731 F.2d at 923 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). See
also Robinson, Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Draft Restatement, 15 L. & POL. INT'L BUs. 1147
(1983) (the term "extraterritorial" is not "conducive to dispassionate analysis").
34. 731 F.2d at 921-26. Utilizing the same nomenclature adopted by the Revised Restate-
ment, the court generally avoided use of "subject matter jurisdiction," instead preferring to
discuss the three aspects of jurisdiction in terms of jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate and to
enforce. Id. at 923; see also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 401; B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON
MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 19 (1979).
35. 731 F.2d at 939. As noted above, that injunction was ultimately dissolved by the House of
Lords. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
36. 731 F.2d at 937.
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inconsistent with the policies underlying comity," however, no such defer-
ence is required. In the court's words, "[n]o nation is under an unremitting
obligation to enforce foreign interests which are fundamentally prejudicial
to those of the domestic forum .... [T]he obligation of comity expires when
the strong public policies of the forum are vitiated by the foreign act.",37
The court found that the British injunction was just such an act, undeni-
ably intended to interfere with the properly invoked jurisdiction of a United
States court. In contrast to such an "offensive" injunction, the U.S. court's
antisuit injunction was "defensive," not designed to interfere with the
British courts, but to protect the jurisdiction of the U.S. court. 38 Moreover,
if the antitrust laws of the U.S. "were clearly intended to reach the injury
charged in the complaint, . . . allowing the defendant's conduct to go unreg-
ulated could amount to an unjustified evasion of United States law injuring
significant domestic interests."'39 In the court's view, the defendants' argu-
ment would require a U.S. court to surrender even its right to make the
threshold determination that a given dispute is within its prescriptive
jurisdiction. 40 Finally, to the extent KLM and Sabena argued that the
conduct of the British Executive was entitled to deference, the court held
that the issue was one "better left to the American Executive to
negotiate. ,41
The Laker Airways defendants' second appeal to comity-that the U.S.
court reconcile the obvious conflict between the United States and the
United Kingdom by abandoning its claim to concurrent prescriptive juris-
diction-is the Timberlane argument and indeed this is where the D.C.
Circuit and the Ninth Circuit most strongly conflict. In the D.C. Circuit's
view, since Congress specifically authorized private treble damage actions
by foreign corporations,42 and because Laker's jurisdictional contacts were
sufficient to permit the legitimate exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction under
section 7 of the Sherman Act, the issue before the court was whether there
existed any ground upon which it could decline to exercise its jurisdiction.43
37. Id. (footnote omitted).
38. Id. at 938.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 939.
41. Id. at 942 n. 121. Indeed, at the apparent behest of the British government, the President
instructed the Justice Department to abandon its grand jury probe of the facts underlying the
Laker dispute. President Reagan Halts Grand Jury Investigation of U.K.-U.S. Air Travel,
[July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1191, at 929 (November 22, 1984).
42. Section 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12, provides in pertinent part:
The word "person" or "persons" wherever used in this Act shall be deemed to include
cornorations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United
States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign
country. [emphasis added]
43. 731 F.2d at 945-46. The court noted the Alcoa case and argued that with the exception of
the 1982 amendment to section 7 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a, Congress had not acted to
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As in Timberlane, the defendants urged comity as that ground: "The sugges-
tion has been made that this court should engage in some form of interest-
balancing, permitting only a 'reasonable' assertion of prescriptive jurisdic-
tion to be implemented.
4 4
The court's response to the arguments of KLM and Sabena is apparent
from its opening volley: "Even as the political branches of the respective
countries have set in motion the legislative policies which have collided in
this litigation, they have deprived courts of the ability meaningfully to
resolve the problem." 45 Thus, the court argued, interest-balancing, particu-
larly where a court is asked to choose between inherently conflicting legal
frameworks, "is hobbled by two primary problems: (1) there are substantial
limitations on the court's ability to conduct a neutral balancing of the
competing interests, and (2) the adoption of interest-balancing is unlikely to
achieve its goal of promoting international comity.
' 46
Citing sections 403(2)(a) and (b) of the Revised Restatement, Timberlane
I and Mannington Mills, the court admonished that some of the factors that
have been included in the balancing calculus are "already evaluated" under
the test for sufficient prescriptive jurisdiction.47 Such factors as the relative
effect on U.S. commerce, the nationality or principal business locations of
the parties and the foreseeability of the impact on U.S. commercial interests
are all properly considered in determining whether the challenged conduct
had a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. foreign
commerce.
48
Aside from the effects factors, however, there are two categories of
factors that Timberlane, Mannington Mills and the Revised Restatement
would have the federal courts consider. First, there are what the D.C.
Circuit considered "neutral" factors, "such as 'the extent to which another
state may have an interest in regulating the activity,' and 'the likelihood of
conflict with regulation by other states."' According to the court, "[p]ur-
suing these inquiries only leads to the obvious conclusion that jurisdiction
could be exercised or that there is a conflict, but does not suggest the best
avenue of conflict resolution., 49 Indeed, this was a principal flaw in the
Ninth Circuit's analysis in Timberlane III, where the mere existence of an
alleged conflict was given almost conclusive effect. As the D.C. Circuit
suggested in Laker Airways, such heavy reliance on the conflict between
modify the test of jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct since the Alcoa case was decided
nearly forty years ago. Id. at 946 & n.137.
44. 731 F.2d at 948, citing RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 403 (footnote omitted).
45. 731 F.2d at 948.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 948 & n.145.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 949.
VOL. 19, NO. 4
ANTITRUST EXTRATERRITORIALITY 1195
U.S. and foreign law simply begs the question whether jurisdiction should
be exercised. If no such conflict exists, the justification for engaging in any
kind of comity analysis will presumably be absent.50 Conversely, the mere
fact of a conflict should at most indicate that the exercise of U.S. antitrust
jurisdiction may offend foreign interests and that other factors need to be
considered. There is no reason why, as Timberlane III suggests, the fact of
conflict alone should automatically lead to abandonment of U.S. antitrust
jurisdiction in deference to foreign law.
Second, and more controversial, are the "political factors," i.e., those
factors whose consideration calls for inherently political as opposed to legal
judgments. 51 Although that line often may be difficult to discern, assessing
the relative importance of conflicting regulations or the degree to which
certain types of regulations are accepted or desirable clearly leads the courts
into areas they have historically avoided.52 Such evaluations would force the
courts to harken back to the days of substantive due process and evaluate the
comparative merits of foreign and domestic legislation. 53 Moreover, in the
Laker Airways court's view, neither an English nor an American court can
"refuse to enforce a law its political branches have already determined is
desirable and necessary. ' 54
The court also found itself institutionally incompetent to adjudicate the
relative importance of U.S. and U.K. competition policies. Such an ad-
judication would at best be illusory since, as the court argued, "[a] proc-
lamation by judicial fiat that one interest is less 'important' than the other
will not ease a real conflict." 55 Moreover, an Article III court is "ill-
equipped to 'balance the vital national interests of the United States and the
[United Kingdom] to determine which interests predominate."' 56
The D.C. Circuit seriously questioned, moreover, whether adopting the
interest balancing approach would appreciably promote international com-
ity. The court took note of the increasing volume of criticism among courts
and commentators directed at interest-balancing, finding that in no instance
had a court declined to exercise its prescriptive jurisdiction based on the
50. 731 F.2d at 954 n.175 ("the existence of conflict alone does not establish the judicial
prerogative to relinquish prescriptive jurisdiction"). Cf. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1302
(Adams, J., concurring). Moreover, a distinction should be drawn between affirmatively
conflicting antitrust policies, such as those at issue in Laker Airways, and policies that are
passive or neutral with respect to antitrust issues such as those of Honduras as reflected in
Timberlane. In the latter case, no real "conflict" with U.S. law may exist.
51. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 403(2)(c), (e), (f), (g), (h); Timberlane 111, 749 F.2d
at 1384-85 (factors (a), (d), (g)); Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98 (factors (3), (6), (9)).
52. See notes 124-28 and accompanying text infra.
53. 731 F.2d at 949.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 949.
56. Id. at 950, quoting In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill.
1978).
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interest-balancing analysis where it could not have reached the same result
based on the lack of effect of the challenged activity on U.S. commerce. 57 In
the court's words, "[w]hen push comes to shove, the domestic forum is
rarely unseated."
58
The court also questioned whether "comity" is indeed an accepted princi-
ple of international law. Acknowledging that U.S. courts will generally
abide by principles of international law absent a contrary indication from the
Congress, 59 the D.C. Circuit found wanting any support either for the
recognition of comity as such a principle or for the notion that concurrent
prescriptive jurisdiction is somehow an inherent evil to be avoided. 60 Ab-
sent any "neutral principles on which to distinguish judicially the reason-
ableness of the concurrent, mutually inconsistent exercises of jurisdiction in
this case," the court refused to adopt any such rule on its own initiative. 61
Finally, there is the question whether a federal court should "defuse
unilaterally" a confrontation with the foreign law by "jettisoning our [the
U.S. court's] jurisdiction." 62 Arguing that "courts are not organs of political
compromise," the D.C. Circuit again declined to dissolve the district court's
injunction. Expressly invoking the constitutional principle of separation of
powers for the first time in its opinion as the basis for its objection to
interest-balancing, the court concluded:
[Bloth institutional limitations on the judicial process and Constitutional restric-
tions on the exercise of judicial power make it unacceptable for the Judiciary to
seize the political initiative and determine that legitimate application of American
laws must evaporate when challenged by a foreign jurisdiction. 63
3. The Conflict
Laker Airways thus stands in stark contrast to Timberlane III in both the
depth of its analysis and its conclusions about the use of interest-balancing.
Although Laker Airways acknowledges the role that interest-balancing may
57. 731 F.2d at 950-51 & n.156. See also A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF
THE U.S.A. 346-56 (3d ed. 1980) (questioning whether Timberlane approach is sufficiently
responsive to foreign concerns).
58. 731 F.2d at 951 & n.158 (footnote omitted).
59. 731 F.2d at 950. See also Henkin, International Law As Law in the United States, 82 MICH.
L. REV. 1555 (1984).
60. 731 F.2d at 950-52. As will be further discussed infra, Judge Wilkey's comments about
the treatment of concurrent prescriptive jurisdiction prompted a significant exchange between
His Honor and the reporters of the Revised Restatement. That dialogue yielded important
changes in the latest version of the Restatement. See notes 81-84 and accompanying text infra.
61. Id. at 953 (footnote omitted).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 954 (footnote omitted). The Laker Airways case now appears to be headed
towards settlement. See Laker's Liquidator Announces Terms ofAgreement That Could Settle
Suits, [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1224, at 185 (July 18, 1985). For a
general discussion of the role of courts in foreign affairs, see L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE CONSTITUTION at 205-24 (2d ed. 1975).
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play when direct conflicts between courts arise, it clearly rejects interest-
balancing as an element of the prescriptive jurisdictional equation. It thus
became the first appellate court squarely to reject Timberlane I's tripartite
test for determining when U.S. antitrust jurisdiction should be applied to
foreign conduct. 64 The conflict between Timberlane III and Laker Airways
in turn is likely to fuel increasing disparities among the circuits as they face
antitrust challenges to foreign conduct.
Laker Airways failed to draw an important distinction, however, between
the approach taken by the Revised Restatement and Timberlane on the one
hand and Mannington Mills on the other. In Mannington Mills, the Third
Circuit perceived itself as faced with two questions: (1) do we have jurisdic-
tion, and (2) assuming we have jurisdiction, should we exercise it in light of
international comity.65 Conceptually, therefore, the Mannington Mills
approach is one of unabashed abstention-assuming that a court has the
jurisdictional power to adjudicate a controversy, it may nevertheless decline
to exercise that jurisdiction. 66
It was to avoid this appearance of abstention that the Revised Restate-
ment and the Timberlane cases incorporated the "direct, substantial and
reasonably foreseeable effects" test into their jurisdictional rule of reason.
That proposed unitary test would weigh traditional "effects" factors along
with international comity and other interests to determine whether the
assertion of "prescriptive jurisdiction" would be "reasonable." Indeed,
appreciating this inclusion is the key to comprehension of the jurisdictional
rule's reason for being-rather than two questions, there is just one: does
the federal court have prescriptive jurisdiction? To decide that issue, a court
must weigh all of the supposedly relevant factors, including whether the
conduct in question had a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable
effect on United States foreign commerce. There is no preliminary decision
regarding jurisdiction based solely on the statutory language. 67
64. But see National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Assoc., 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981)
(indicating that "pertinence" of third prong of Timberlane test may be open to question); In re
Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. I11. 1979). Contra Montreal
Trading Ltd. v. AMAX, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001
(1982) (endorsing Timberlane approach). It is notable that Timberlane III neither acknowl-
edges the existence of Laker Airways nor makes any attempt to address the D.C. Circuit's
criticism of the jurisdictional rule of reason.
65. 595 F.2d at 1291-92, 1294-98. See also In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248,
1255 (7th Cir. 1980).
66. 595 F.2d at 1291-92. See generally 1 ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 4, at 166-69; 1 W.
FUGATE, supra note 5, at 78-80.
67. See, e.g., Swan, International Antitrust: The Reach and Efficacy of United States Law, 63
OR. L. REV. 177, 203-08 (1984); Craig, Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act: The
Search for a Jurisdictional Standard, 7 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. J. 295, 314-18 (1983). The
continued use of "subject matter jurisdiction" is thus viewed as a throw-back to an outmoded
conceptual framework typified by Mannington Mills. Substitution of "jurisdiction to pre-
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B. THE RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES
The Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States was developed over a period of nearly ten years before its final
adoption in 1965.68 Divided into four parts, jurisdiction, recognition, inter-
national agreements and responsibility of states for injuries to aliens, the
Restatement (Second) sought to synthesize the most essential aspects of
U.S. foreign relations law which, in its view, comprehended both interna-
tional law and domestic U.S. law to the extent domestic U.S. law gives effect
to international law or concerns foreignorelations.6 9
The Revised Restatement, although standing "on the shoulders" 70 of the
Restatement (Second), represents a much more ambitious undertaking-
one whose ambitiousness is no doubt a reflection of the increasing impor-
tance of the rule of law in foreign relations. In contrast to the four part
division of the Restatement (Second), the Revised Restatement is orga-
nized into nine parts and is far more comprehensive in its treatment of
foreign relations issues than was its predecessor.
7
'
In the area of jurisdiction and, more particularly, in the area of U.S.
antitrust jurisdiction, the Revised Restatement would work a significant
change in the Restatement (Second)'s treatment of foreign conduct chal-
lenged under U.S. antitrust law. As one commentator has noted, however,
"[r]ather than clarifying the current law in this area, the Reporters have
rather muddied the waters in their treatment of antitrust jurisdiction." 72
Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) provides that, where the rules of
law prescribed by two states with valid claims to prescriptive jurisdiction
would "require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person" subject to
both states' jurisdiction, those states should "consider, in good faith, mod-
scribe," to "adjudicate" and to "enforce" is thus favored by most proponents of the jurisdic-
tional rule and has been adopted by the Revised Restatement. See generally Lowenfeld,
Antitrust, Interest Analysis, and the New Conflict of Laws, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1976, 1978-84
(1982) (reviewing J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (2d
ed. 1981)); Industrial Investment Development Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85
n.7 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES VII
(1965) ("RESTATEMENT (SECOND)"). See also Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts, or
"There and Back Again," 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 7, 13 (1984).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) IX & §§ 1, 2.
70. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) 1.
71. The nine parts are: (1) International Law and Its Relation to United States Law; (2)
Persons in International Law; (3) International Agreements; (4) Jurisdiction and Judgments;
(5) The Law of the Sea; (6) The Law of the Environment; (7) Protection of Persons (Natural
and Judicial); (8) Selected Law of International Economic Relations; and (9) Remedies for
Violations of International Law. The jurisdictional provisions discussed here are contained in
part IV.
72. Fugate, supra note I1, at 50. For a good discussion of the securities law aspects of the
Revised Restatement, see Goelzer, Stillman, Walter, Sullivan & Michael, The Draft Revised
Restatement: A Critique From a Securities Regulation Perspective, 19 INT'L LAW. 431 (1985).
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erating the exercise of [their] enforcement jurisdiction," by weighing five
factors: (1) the vital national interests of each of the states; (2) the extent and
the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would
impose upon the person; (3) the extent to which the required conduct is to
take place in the territory of the other state; (4) the nationality of the person;
and (5) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by
that state.73 By its terms, therefore, section 40 only applies to circumstances
of conflicting, concurrent "jurisdiction to prescribe" where the exercise of
both states' enforcement jurisdiction would require inconsistent conduct on
the part of a person subject to the jurisdiction of both states.74 It prescribes a
rule of comity, intended to moderate enforcement jurisdiction; it does not
directly limit prescriptive jurisdiction as a matter of international law.
Section 403 of the Revised Restatement would substitute the concept of
"reasonableness" for the Restatement (Second)'s principle of comity, re-
focusing the relevant inquiry on the reasonableness of a given state's juris-
diction to prescribe as opposed to the moderation of its enforcement
through the exercise of comity. 75 As one commentator has argued, "this
isn't a matter of comity as the idea is set forth in section 40 of the present
Restatement. This is a legal disability under international law." 76
Section 403 sets forth the Revised Restatement's general formula for
limiting the reach of U.S. law, i.e., the limit of legitimate exercise of U.S.
jurisdiction to prescribe. Although some basis in conduct may exist for
invoking that jurisdiction under section 402, 7 7 section 403(1) instructs legis-
latures, courts and administrative bodies to find jurisdiction wanting when
its invocation would be "unreasonable." Unreasonableness is determined
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 40 (emphasis added).
74. Fugate, supra note 11, at 63.
75. See, e.g., Maier, supra note 68, at 9-10.
76. The Draft Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised), 76
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 184, 196 (1982) (comments of John Houck). See also RESTATEMENT
(REVISED) § 403, reporter's note 10.
77. Section 402 provides:
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1)(a) conduct a substantial part of which takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its territory;
(2) the activities, status, interests or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its
territory; or
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals which is directed
against the security of the state or a limited class of other state interests.
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 402. Section 402(1)(c) acknowledges the "effects" doctrine,
although with some qualification. Id., comment d. See also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 415,
comment d (taking no position as to whether a threatened effect on U.S. commerce alone
would justify the exercise of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 18.
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by balancing a list of unranked factors which, in part, encompass and
reiterate the underlying U.S. statutory prerequisites for the exercise of U.S.
antitrust jurisdiction, i.e., that the conduct in question produce a direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce:
(2) Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable or unreasonable is
judged by evaluating all the relevant factors, including, where appropriate
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating
state, or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the
regulating state;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activ-
ity, between the regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the law or
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or
hurt by the regulation in question;
(e) the importance of the regulation in question to the international
political, legal or economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions
of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.78
This multifactor analysis is incorporated by reference in section 415, "Juris-
diction to Apply Antitrust Laws," and thereby made directly applicable to
U.S. antitrust jurisdiction.7 9
The jurisdictional provisions of the Revised Restatement, and the use of
interest-balancing in the context of antitrust jurisdiction generally, have
been the subject of extensive debate and commentary. 80 More recently, the
78. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 403(2).
79. Section 415 provides:
(1) Any agreement in restraint of United States trade made in the United States, and any
conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade carried out in significant measure in the
United States, is subject to the jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States, regardless of the
nationality or place of business of the parties to the agreement or of the participants in the
conduct.
(2) Any agreement in restraint of United States trade made outside of the United States,
and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade carried out predominantly outside of
the United States, is subject to the jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States, if a principal
purpose of the conduct or agreement is to interfere with the commerce of the United States,
and the agreement or conduct has some effect on that commerce.
(3) Other agreements or conduct in restraint of United States trade are subject to the
jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States if such agreements or conduct have substantial
effect on the commerce of the United States and the exercise of jurisdiction is not unreason-
able.
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 415. See also id, comment a; Fugate, supra note 11, at 56-65.
80. See, e.g., Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterrito-
rial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1312-14 (1985); Maier, supra note 68; Fugate, supra
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dialogue concerning the Restatement has focused on its apparent suggestion
that, in any given case, only one state will have a legitimate claim to the
reasonable exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction. In previous drafts of the
Restatement, section 403's balancing test could have been viewed as a tool
for determining which state had such a claim.81 The latest revisions to
section 403, however, clarify that it may be reasonable for more than one
state to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction in a given set of circumstances.82
Professor Maier argues that now the reasonableness test "embodied in
section 403(1) and (2), clearly indicates only that meeting a threshold of
reasonableness is a prerequisite to jurisdiction, not that solely the state with
the most reasonable relationship to a transaction or event may have jurisdic-
tion as a matter of either international or domestic law." 83 These changes
were prompted in large part by the debate sparked by Laker Airways.84
The question remains, however, as to the underlying import of section
403, i.e. that courts will engage in the same kind of interest-balancing as will
Congress and the Executive in determining when the exercise of U.S.
prescriptive jurisdiction would be reasonable.85 Neither section 403 nor
section 415, however, draws any distinction between the use of the proposed
approach by the courts and by Congress or the Executive. This flows directly
note 11; Dunfee & Friedman, The Extra- Territorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws:
A Proposal for An Interim Solution, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 883 (1984); Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdic-
tion Under Customary International Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783 (1984); Note, Reasonableness
As A Limit To Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 62 WASH. U. L. Q. 681 (1984); Swan, supra note 67,
at 196-216; Shenefield, Extraterritoriality in Antitrust, 15 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 1109 (1983);
Robinson, supra note 33; Craig, supra note 67; Grippando, Declining to Exercise Extraterrito-
rial Antitrust Jurisdiction on Grounds of International Comity: An Illegitimate Extension of the
Judicial Abstention Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 395 (1983); Maier, Interest-Balancing and
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. ComP. L. 579 (1983); Shenefield, Thoughts on Ex-
traterritorial Application of the United States Antitrust Laws, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 350 (1983);
Kadish, Comity and the International Application of the Sherman Act: Encouraging the Courts
to Enter the Political Arena, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 130 (1982); Lowenfeld, supra note 67;
Davidow, Extraterritorial Antitrust and the Concept of Comity, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 500
(1981); Marcuss & Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United States Trade Law: The Need
for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 439 (1981); and Rahl, International
Application of American Antitrust Laws: Issues and Proposals, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 336
(1980).
81. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 403
(Tent. Draft No. 2, March 27, 1981). See also Letter from Hon. Malcolm R. Wilkey to
Professor Louis Henkin (Apr. 24, 1984), reprinted in Maier, supra note 68, at 43; Robinson,
supra note 33, at 1153-54.
82. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 403(3) & comment d.
83. Maier, supra note 68, at 41.
84. Id. at 33-40. Professor Maier perhaps goes too far by suggesting that these changes bring
the Revised Restatement full circle to a refined version of the comity approach of section 40. Id.
at 40. Section 403 remains a test of prescriptive jurisdiction and is not, as is section 40, designed
merely to temper enforcement based on that jurisdiction. See generally Fugate, supra note 11,
at 62-65.
85. Indeed, Professor Maier points out that even the latest draft of section 403 "does
not .. .address the problem raised by Judge Wilkey, and by this author, that the judicial
forum is an inappropriate forum for balancing many of the national interests involved in these
cases." Maier, supra note 68, at 39. See also Maier, supra note 80, at 597.
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from section 401, which treats courts, legislatures and the executive alike for
purposes of defining and limiting a state's jurisdiction to prescribe.
Section 401 describes a state's authority in terms of three categories of
jurisdiction:
Under international law, a state is subject to limitations on its authority to
exercise
(1) "jurisdiction to prescribe," i.e., to make its law applicable to the activi-
ties, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether
by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or
by determination of a court;
(2) "jurisdiction to adjudicate," i.e., to subject persons or things to the
process of its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or in criminal
proceedings, and whether or not the state is a party to the proceedings; and
(3) "jurisdiction to enforce," i.e., to induce or compel compliance or punish
noncompliance with its laws or regulations, whether through the courts or by
use of executive, administrative, police, or other nonjudicial action.8 6
This division of jurisdiction into three "compartments" reflects a substan-
tial change from the Restatement (Second), which viewed jurisdiction in
terms of two categories, jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to
enforce.8 7 Moreover, the Restatement (Second) did not include court deter-
minations within its definition of jurisdiction to prescribe, but rather viewed
such activities as an aspect of enforcement jurisdiction. 88 Although the
Restatement (Revised) acknowledges that there are substantial differences
in the limitations of a state's jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate and to
enforce, the drafters nevertheless include court determinations within the
Restatement's definition of jurisdiction to prescribe. Through sections 403
and 415, the Restatement builds on that definition, by expecting courts,
legislatures and the executive alike to utilize the same multifactor balancing
test in determining when, as a matter of international law, the exercise of
U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction in the antitrust context would be reasonable.
As will be seen, by so doing, the Reporters of the Revised Restatement
plant the seed of a serious conceptual pitfall to the rule of jurisdiction
proposed in section 403, one that raises questions about the legitimacy and
workability of the Revised Restatement within the federal context.
C. CONGRESS ATTEMFrS TO CODIFY TIMBERLANE: S. 397
In February of this year, Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D. Ariz.) introduced
S. 397, the "Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1985."89 The bill
86. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 401 (emphasis added). See also Maier, supra note 80, at 582.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 6-7. See also FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-
Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1315-18 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The reporters do caution, however, that
the three categories of jurisdiction set forth in section 401 are not intended to be rigid. "discrete
conceptual categories." RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 401, comment a.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 6, comment a; RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 401, reporters'
note 2.
89. S. 397, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 1160-63 (dailyed. Feb. 6, 1985). Section I
of the bill sets forth its short title.
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is divided into five sections and would amend various provisions of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts in order to, in the words of its sponsor, "rational-
ize further the application of U.S. antitrust law to U.S. foreign trade by
supplementing the provisions of the 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improve-
ments Act. . .,9o
Section 2 of the bill would amend section 7 of the Sherman Act 9' by
adding a new section "(b)" that would require a court faced with a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a preliminary matter,
without permitting any discovery or other proceedings unrelated to the
motion, to proceed with the motion prior to any determination on the
merits. The bill makes this presumably expedited procedure "the duty" of
the judge designated to hear the case.92 According to Sen. DeConcini's
statement accompanying the bill, the section
... works no substantive change in the 1982 Act's provisions concerning antitrust
subject matter jurisdiction. Instead it is directed to the procedural difficulties that
arise in attempting to give this language its intended effect. Defendants to anti-
trust actions often find that the courts are reluctant to consider whether they have
subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute until after the parties have largely
completed their discovery of facts from one another and from third parties.
93
The provisions of section 2 thus seek to address the complaints that have
been directed not only at the scope of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction, but at the
U.S.'s "unparalleled provisions for wide-ranging pretrial discovery."
9 4
The most significant change intended by the bill is reflected in section 3
which would add a new section to the Clayton Act, section 21, mandating
interest-balancing by a court faced with an antitrust action set in the context
of international trade. The section provides, in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the antitrust laws or any provision of any
State laws similar to the antitrust laws, in any action brought by any person or
State under the antitrust laws or similar State laws and involving trade or com-
merce with a foreign nation, the court shall enter a judgment dismissing such
action whenever it determines that the interests of the United States served by the
action are outweighed by the interests of one or more foreign nations adversely
affected by the action. Upon a request by the court, the Attorney General shall
appear to set forth the views of the United States as to the effects of the action on
the interests of the United States and on any affected foreign nation. 95
90. Id. at 1161.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 6a. The 1982 Act amended the substantive provisions of the Sherman and
FTC Acts to clarify that their prohibitions only apply to foreign conduct having a "'direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect' on domestic commerce or domestic exports" of a
U.S. person. See H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982).
92. 131 Cong. Rec. at 1161.
93. Id. It is ironic that this precise criticism has been leveled at the interest-balancing
approach, whose laundry list of factors will necessarily require discovery of numerous issues
including the views of the U.S. and relevant foreign governments. See, e.g., Laker Airways. 731
F.2d at 950. See also notes 135-40 and accompanying text infra.
94. 131 Cong. Rec. at 1162.
95. Id. at 1161 (emphasis added). The section also contains a parallel provision to the
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According to Sen. DeConcini, section 3 of the bill is "intended to codify,
and improve the operation of, the 'jurisdictional rule of reason' in private
antitrust actions involving commerce with foreign nations." 96 Although the
section clearly is intended to embrace Timberlane, it deliberately stops short
of specifying the factors relevant to the interest balancing inquiry. Choice of
relevant factors is left to the courts.97
In his statement accompanying S. 397, Sen. DeConcini suggests three
possible criticisms of the Timberlane-style approach that S. 397 would
mandate: (1) some of the factors that have been considered in connection
with interest balancing may not be "useful" in "determining which nation is
most affected by the parties' business conduct"; (2) the court may not be
well suited for the task of balancing national interests; and (3) the jurisdic-
tional rule of reason is not an accepted rule of international law.98
In response to the first of these anticipated criticisms, the senator points
out that the bill does not endorse any particular list of factors, but rather
"rests on the finding that the kinds of factors enumerated in the leading
decisions and the authoritative commentaries can properly and usefully be
considered by antitrust courts in balancing U.S. and foreign interests. " 99 Of
course, this merely begs the question how courts are to administer the
mandated test and wholly fails to respond to the criticism even as character-
proposed amendment to section 7 of the Sherman Act that would require the court to expedite
treatment of a motion to dismiss brought under the section. Id. at 1162.
96. Id. The provision would not apply to actions brought by the government, which is
presumed to engage in a similar balancing of interests as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.
Where "prosecutorial zeal threatens foreign interests," the Executive remains able to "rem-
edy" the situation. Id. Indeed, concern over second-guessing by the courts prompted the
government to request further study time from the American Law Institute prior to adoption of
the Revised Restatement. Unlike S. 397, the Restatement as it now stands would not excuse the
government from having to justify the exercise of jurisdiction through the balancing process in
the courts, regardless of any similar, internal governmental efforts that preceded the filing of
suit.
97. Id. at 1162. See also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 403, comment b (list of factors in section
403(2) not intended to be exhaustive).
98. 131 Cong. Rec. at 1162. See also Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1985:
Hearings on S. 397 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 21,
1985) (statement of Senator Thurmond) (listing as issues requiring exploration: (1) the poten-
tial for intragovernmental policy conflicts; (2) the potential for intradepartmental policy
conflicts; (3) the ability of courts to engage in interest balancing; (4) the bill's requirement that,
if asked, the Attorney General "shall appear" to set forth the government's views; and (5) the
impact of the bill on private antitrust enforcement). Neither Sen. DeConcini nor Sen. Thur-
mond raise the issue of the bill's constitutionality. Arguably, if interest-balancing would require
the judiciary to exercise a function allocated by the Constitution to Congress or the Executive,
the Congress could not constitutionally delegate that authority to the courts. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has demonstrated its willingness to strike down attempts by the Congress to
alter the constitutional scheme of compartmentalized functions. See, e.g., Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (one house veto unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power); Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (bankruptcy courts unconstitutional delegation of the judicial power).
99. 131 Cong. Rec. at 1162.
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ized by Sen. DeConcini. Courts are left with virtually no guidance as to what
factors are significant in the opinion of the Congress and as to the relative
significance of different factors. Such an unguided approach likely will result
in courts making dispositive either the mere fact of conflict, as arguably did
the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane III, or the effect on U.S. commerce. In the
former case, the goal of enlightened analysis will hardly have been achieved;
in the latter case, the act will prove ineffectual. Indeed, this lack of guidance
in part prompted the Department of Justice and the Department of State to
oppose the bill, fearing that the open-ended test proposed by section 3
would invite the courts to enter the arena of foreign affairs-an arena that in
their view should remain the province of the Executive.
100
Second, acknowledging that complaints from courts and commentators
regarding the limitations of the judiciary are the "most serious criticism,"
the Senator offers two responses. First, citing Timberlane III, he argues that
'''political' considerations" are not likely to play an important role in
balancing. The Senator also argues that any difficulties in weighing political
considerations are alleviated by the bill's provision that a court may request
from the attorney general, and the attorney general is obligated to supply to
the court, a statement of the government's views as to the relevant political
considerations in a given case.' 0'
The Senator's first response to the judicial limitations criticism, that
political considerations are not likely to play an important role in the
balancing process, ignores the reality of interest-balancing. Its reason for
being is political tension between the U.S. and the state whose nationals
have been made defendants in a U.S. court or in whose territory the
challenged conduct took place. The nature of the controversy is necessarily
political and diplomatic.1
0 2
100. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 397 Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 21, 1985) (statement of Abraham D.
Sofaer, legal adviser, Department of State, at 8-10; statement of Charles F. Rule, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, at 9-11). The Justice Department would limit
the courts's role to considering "objective" factors, such as, whether the challenged conduct
had direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effects on U.S. domestic or import com-
merce, whether enforcement is likely to achieve compliance, whether there was intent to harm
or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effects and the relative significance of
those effects in the U.S. and abroad. "Political" issues would be left to the Executive. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) §§ 403(2)(c), (e), (f), (g) and (h).
101. 131 Cong. Rec. at 1162.
102.' Sen. DeConcini's citation to Timberlane III illustrates the point. The Ninth Circuit's
heavy reliance on "the degree of conflict with foreign policy" required it to make a fun-
damentally political assessment of Honduras' policies with respect to anticompetitive activities.
Thus, as noted above, the court concluded: "The application of United States antitrust law in
this case creates a potential conflict with the Honduran goverment's effort to foster a particular
type of business climate." Timberlane III, 749 F.2d at 1384. Such assessments of what will and
what will not offend foreign governments clearly cannot be viewed as nonpolitical or even
apolitical.
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Sen. DeConcini's second response, that any institutional deficiencies
faced by the courts in assessing political factors can be cured by providing
the courts with direct access to the attorney general, is also unpersuasive.
First, the implication of the relevant bill provisions is that the executive
branch can feed the court the political assessment it needs only to have the
court parrot that assessment and abide by it in its decision on the jurisdic-
tional question. This appearance of an executive/judicial consortium would
be even more pronounced in the event a foreign state chooses not to express
its views. Yet, the purpose of interest-balancing in part is to permit the
courts to make an independent assessment of U.S. and foreign interests, not
to turn them into a voice of the Executive. 103
Moreover, requiring the attorney general to provide the government's
views raises additional, serious questions. There may be instances where for
diplomatic or other reasons the government would prefer not to make a
public assessment as to the policies of a given foreign state.' 0 4 For these
reasons it would be advisable to make the attorney general's participation in
any case as amicus curiae optional.
10 5
Lastly, Sen. DeConcini urges his colleagues to accept "the core concern
of the jurisdictional rule of reason" as a principle of international law.' 06 At
best, however, the degree to which Timberlane-style balancing and the
"principle of reasonableness" generally are considered to constitute a rule
of international law remains subject to debate.10 7
Section 4 of the bill would amend section 12 of the Clayton Act by adding
a new section that "is intended to remove any uncertainty that the well-
103. Of course, it is common practice for the Supreme Court in the domestic context to seek
the views of the Justice Department regarding petitions for writs of certiorari filed in private
antitrust and other actions.
104. This potentiality again highlights the necessarily political nature of the assessment
process being forced upon the courts.
105. Indeed, this was the conclusion of the Task Force appointed by the Antitrust Section of
the American Bar Association to study S. 397. The Task Force Report recommends making
court solicitation of government views mandatory, but participation by the attorney general
optional. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 397 Before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 21, 1985) (American Bar
Association Section of Antitrust Law, Report on S. 397, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 1985, at 23).
106. 131 Cong. Rec. at 1162. In so concluding, Sen. DeConcini heavily relies upon Meessen,
Antitrust Jurisdiction under Customary International Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783 (1984).
Although Sen. DeConcini is careful not to overstate Professor Meessen's conclusions, his
argument strongly suggests that international law supports Timberlane-style balancing as
endorsed by S. 397. Yet, Professor Meessen clearly concludes that neither Timberlane nor
section 403 of the REVISED RESTATEMENT reflect international law. Id. at 802 (" Timberlane is too
open a rule to be operable on the level of international law"). But see RESTATEMENT (REVISED)
§ 403, comment a.
107. See, e.g., Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 950; Robinson, supra note 33, at 1152 (arguing
that section 403 of the Revised Restatement "does not accurately reflect the state of interna-
tional law"); Rosenthal, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Sovereign Nations, 19 INT'L LAW. 487
(1985).
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established doctrine of forum non conveniens ... is applicable to antitrust
suits involving trade or commerce with foreign nations.''108 According to
Sen. DeConcini:
Under this doctrine, a court may decline jurisdiction over a lawsuit, and send the
plaintiff to an alternative forum, including a foreign forum, where trial of the
lawsuit in the other forum would better serve the overall convenience of the
parties and the courts and would be in the interests of justice.109
This provision of the bill would effectively overrule several decisions of the
lower courts in which forum non conveniens was rejected as a legitimate
basis for dismissal of an antitrust action where the alternative forum was a
foreign court. 1 0 In Sen. DeConcini's view, the availability of this additional.
option will aid the courts in lessening the tensions that may be prompted by
the exercise of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction.
Forum non conveniens, however, is extremely unlikely to assist in the
resolution of difficult cases of conflicting jurisdiction. A prerequisite for
invocation of the doctrine is the adequacy of the alternate forum.' In the
antitrust area, however, since the source of conflict likely will be the foreign
state's rejection of U.S. antitrust principles, no adequate alternate forum
will be available." 
2
The final provision of the bill, section 5, would add yet another tool to the
federal courts's arsenal of comity weapons. The section would permit courts
to limit a private party's recovery to actual damages, interest and litigation
costs, including attorneys fees, if three conditions are met: (1) the claim
must "result from conduct occurring in the course of trade or commerce with
a foreign nation," (2) the claim must "affect adversely and substantially the
interests of a foreign nation," and (3) it must be shown that the adverse
impact of the claim "would be substantially reduced" if the plaintiff's
recovery was so limited.11
3
108. 131 Cong. Rec. at 1162. Sen. DeConcini cites Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235
(1981), as an example of the approach intended to be codified.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. See, e.g., Industrial Investment Development Corp. v. Mitsui Co., 671 F.2d 876,
890-91 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983); Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Pan American Airways, 568 F. Supp. 811, 817-18 (D.D.C. 1983).
111. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 ("if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so
clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law
may be given substantial weight; the district court may conclude that dismissal would not be in
the interests of justice") (footnote omitted). This fact prompted the Laker Airways court to
reject the forum non conveniens approach. Laker Airways, 568 F. Supp. at 817-18.
112. The Department of Justice indicated its skepticism about the effectiveness of section 4
of the bill for this precise reason. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1985: Hearings
on S. 397 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (June 21, 1985) (statement of Charles F.
Rule, acting assistant attorney general, Antitrust Division, at 6) ("[a]lthough we support the
intent of [the forum non conveniens provision], we do not believe that [it is] likely to have a very
significant practical effect"). But see Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterritorial
Application of United States Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L.J. 1693 (1985).
113. 131 Cong. Rec. at 1161.
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The provision is prompted by the perception that the treble damage
remedy is one of the sources of foreign criticism of U.S. antitrust law.' 14 The
section, however, is subject to the same criticism that has been voiced
concerning the jurisdictional rule of reason-it places courts in the position
of gauging a foreign nation's response to the possible imposition of treble
damages on persons subject to that state's jurisdiction without any guidance
as to the methods to be utilized for making that determination. It also invites
courts to enter the arena of foreign affairs, placing themselves in a position
of in effect having to negotiate with a foreign state as to the remedy to be
imposed on persons subject to its jurisdiction. Although limiting the treble
damage remedy may be a valuable concession to foreign criticism of U.S.
antitrust law, a more objective standard should be developed for use by the
courts. 115
II. Constitutional Authority and Judicial Expertise
The lurking issues posed by Timberlane III, the Revised Restatement and
S. 397 remain-should courts, either on their own or at the behest of
Congress and the Executive, go beyond the "direct, substantial and reason-
ably foreseeable" effects standard of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 19821 16 to dismiss federal antitrust actions based on a balancing
of national interests and other factors. There is the question of constitu-
tional authority and the intertwined issue of judicial expertise in the area of
foreign relations, as well as problems of administration and procedure.
The initial problem raised by interest-balancing is its apparent detach-
ment from the federalist framework. This is reflected in the Revised State-
ment's treatment of courts as equals of the coordinate branches for purposes
of defining jurisdiction to prescribe; in the debate among court's as to the
applicability of the label "abstention" to the jurisdictional rule of reason;
and in S. 397's willingness to delegate an essentially executive function to the
114. 131 Cong. Rec. at 1163.
115. The Antitrust Division has asked the Committee to delay further consideration of the
detrebling provisions of S. 397 until the projected completion of the Georgetown Project on
treble damages later this year. Foreign Antitrust Improvements Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 397
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (June 21, 1985) (statement of
Charles F. Rule, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, at 12-14).
116. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402, 96 Stat. 1233, 1246-47 (1982) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a).
The legislative history indicates that Congress intended "neither to prevent nor to encourage"
Timberlane-type balancing tests. H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982). The
House Report accompanying the bill, however, went on to state that "the bill is not intended to
restrict the application of American laws to extraterritorial conduct where the requisite effects
exist or to the extraterritorial pursuit of evidence in appropriate cases." Id. (emphasis added).
Professor Fugate maintains that the Act effectively overruled Timberlane. Fugate, supra note
11, at 53. But see Swan, supra note 67, at 215-16 (interest-balancing is unaffected by Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982).
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courts. In each case the traditional role of courts within the federal system
has been circumvented or simply ignored.
Yet, it is well settled that "federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction."1 17 As such, "[tjhey are empowered to hear only such cases as
are within the judicial power of the United States, as defined in the Constitu-
tion, and have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant by
Congress."" 8 Viewed in this context, a federal court does not have jurisdic-
tion to prescribe, i.e., power to prescribe, in the same sense as does Con-
gress or the Executive, save in those areas where such power has been
delegated to it, such as in the area of Sherman Act enforcement, or ceded to
it, as in the limited area covered by federal common law. 119 Its role is
otherwise limited to determining whether, in a given case, Congress ex-
pressly has provided for the court to hear the case, whether Congress can
delegate that authority within the bounds of the Constitution and whether
the activities challenged and before the court can constitutionally be pre-
scribed by the Congress. Only if the answer to these three preliminary
inquiries is affirmative can the court proceed and exercise its "jurisdiction to
adjudicate." In the past, courts and commentators have labelled this ability
to entertain a particular case or controversy "subject matter jurisdiction."
Use of "subject matter jurisdiction" has been criticized, particularly in
the context of the debate over the reach of U.S. antitrust law. It places a
conceptual framework on the issue of jurisdiction over foreign conduct that
equates use of an interest-balancing approach with judicial abstention. 120 In
an attempt to circumvent that conclusion, the Revised Restatement, and
arguably S. 397 and Timberlane III, view court judgments as yet another
aspect of jurisdiction to prescribe.
The Revised Restatement seeks to accomplish this end by adjusting the
jurisdictional equation. The substance of that equation, however, cannot be
altered through mere relabelling. Indeed, even the courts and commenta-
tors that have embraced the jurisdictional rule of reason have struggled with
the need to accommodate the well-entrenched notions that underlie the
concept of subject matter jurisdiction.1 21 Given that framework, the issue
becomes whether and to what extent a court can and/or should rely on a
balancing of unranked factors to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds an other-
wise congressionally authorized claim for relief.' 22 As Professor Rahl suc-
cinctly put it: "[clomity is a laudable and indeed essential idea in interna-
117. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 22 (4th ed. 1983).
118. Id.
119. See generally M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 79-108 (1980).
120. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 401, comment c; Lowenfeld, supra note 67, at 1978-84.
121. See, e.g., Lowenfeld, supra note 67, at 1978-84; Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1299
(Adams, J., concurring).
122. Grippando, supra note 80, at 400; Rahl, supra note 80, at 363.
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tional relations. As a ground for outright dismissal of a cause of action
otherwise authorized by Congress, however, it gives rise to some prob-
lems.' 12
3
There are serious doubts about the legitimacy of federal courts declining
to exercise their jurisdiction based on interests of international comity.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that absent one of the traditional bases
for abstention, a federal court has a "virtually unflagging obligation" to
exercise the jurisdiction delegated to it by the Congress. 124 Thus, when the
courts have declined to hear a given controversy they have generally re-
quired some basis grounded in the Constitution's allocation of powers for
doing so. 125 In the area of foreign affairs, that basis has often been the
assignment of authority over issues of foreign relations to the Executive and
the Congress. 126 In the past, courts have repeatedly abstained from entering
that arena, declaring such issues "non-justiciable." 1 27
In the case of interest-balancing, courts are being urged to abandon this
well-settled aversion to adjudicating issues that directly impact on U.S.
foreign relations. Instead, the courts are being instructed to examine sub-
missions from foreign governments, the U.S. executive, private parties and
possibly others, in order to determine whether the "interests" of the U.S. in
antitrust enforcement are outweighed by the interests of other states in light
of a number of factors. It is ironic that where in the past courts have declined
to go for want of authority they are now being urged to go, arguably in order
to reach the same conclusion, that a given case is, in a sense, "non-
justiciable. ,128
123. Rahl, supra note 80, at 363. Rahl lists three such problems: (1) whether a court can
legitimately exercise such broad discretion absent congressional approval; (2) whether and how
a court can adequately inform itself of the policies and interests to be weighed; and (3) whether
procedures could be developed systematically to implement such a complex balancing
approach.
124. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976). See also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) ("We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not
given").
125. Cf. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function,
94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984).
126. See generally L. Henkin, supra note 63, at 205-24; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246
U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (foreign relations committed to the "political" branches-the legislative
and the executive). The Departments of State and Justice cited separation of powers as one of
their reasons for objecting to the jurisdictional rule of reason contemplated by S. 397. See note
100 and accompanying text supra.
127. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 3533 (1984); Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577
F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom., Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities
Service Oil Co., 442 U.S. 928 (1979); Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1309 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F.
Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), affd per curiam, 755 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985).
128. Such non-justiciable issues have been grouped under the "political question" doctrine.
See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 117, at 74-81; L. HENKIN, supra note 63, at 210-16;
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Moreover, as Professor Grippando points out, unlike the areas of act of
state and state sovereign compulsion, here "comity" is being invoked as a
defense by foreign private parties on the assumption that offending such
parties is equivalent to offending their governments.1 29 Although as a
practical matter that assumption may be true in some cases, it is far more
difficult to justify abstention based on a separation of powers theory when
private parties are involved as opposed to their governments.
Commentators and courts also have questioned a court's competence and
ability to engage in the kind of foreign policy interest-balancing called for by
the Revised Restatement, S. 397 and Timberlane III. This was of particular
concern to Judge Marshall in the uranium litigation,' 30 and more recently to
the D.C. Circuit in the Laker Airways litigation 13t and the Departments of
Justice and State.132 Where a foreign private party fails to appear in court
even to argue the propriety of jurisdiction or the U.S. executive declines to
express the views of the current administration, the adversarial guarantee
that the court will be adequately informed of the competing interests is
absent. Thus, while the balancing approach may be an appropriate tool to
inform prosecutorial discretion, it raises serious questions in the judicial
context. 133 It is ironic indeed that, as noted above, the political question
doctrine, long an accepted although debated basis for judicial abstention, is
based upon the assumption that courts are not only constitutionally in-
appropriate forums for weighing such policy considerations, but are institu-
tionally incapable of doing so. 134
Henkin, Is There A "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J., at 597 (1976). In Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court set forth three criteria for determining the
non-justiciability of a given issue: (1) does the issue involve resolution of questions committed
by the Constitution to a coordinate branch of government; (2) does the court have the expertise
to consider the issues; and (3) are there prudential considerations that counsel against a finding
of justiciability? Id. at 217. See also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
129. Grippando, supra note 80, at 397-98.
130. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. I11. 1979).
131. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 948-50. See also Lowenfeld, supra note 67, at 1984; Maier
supra note 68, at 23-24, 39-40; Kadish, supra note 80, at 164-66.
132. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of]985: Hearings on S. 397 Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 21, 1985) (statement of Abraham D.
Sofaer, Legal Advisor, Department of State, at 10; statement of Charles F. Rule, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, at 9-10).
133. See, e.g., American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Task Force Report: The
Antitrust Guide for International Operations Revisited 7 (1984); Statement of William F.
Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Before the Subcommittee on Monop-
olies and Commercial Law, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Concern-
ing International Aspects of Antitrust Enforcement 10-11 (Nov. 19, 1981); Rahl, supra note 80,
at 363-64.
134. See note 128 and accompanying text supra. The proposed test also lacks any bench-
marks or procedures to guarantee its uniform application. Although this could also be said of
any amorphous, balancing test involving consideration of a complex list of unranked factors,
the spectre of conflicts among and within the circuits based on variations in foreign policy over
time or judicial perception of that policy remains.
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The use of any interest-balancing formula also can be objectionable for
procedural reasons. The test will inevitably require extensive "nonmerits"
discovery and perhaps requests for submissions from U.S. and foreign
government political branches.1 35 Indeed, the long history of the Timber-
lane cases reinforces the perceived difficulties of the test in the context of a
preliminary jurisdictional proceeding. Use of the interest-balancing ap-
proach in Timberlane required the creation of an exhaustive discovery
record and, more troubling, the district court's pretrial resolution of numer-
ous fact issues going to the core of Timberlane's substantive antitrust
complaint. 136 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's test appeared to require less of
an exercise in weighing issues of politics and sovereignty than an archetyp-
ical conflict of laws analysis in which United States law generally defers to
foreign law. In the conflict of laws area, however, both domestic and
international, a U.S. court's analysis begins with the presumption that a
judicial forum is available to the plaintiff. The only issue before the court is
what state's or nation's laws should be applied. 137 The presence of an
available judicial forum is also a critical prerequisite to application of
domestic "abstention" doctrines.' 38 Since a critical reason for declining to
exercise jurisdiction will usually be the incompatibility of U.S. antitrust law
with the laws or policies of a foreign nation, however, no alternative to the
U.S. forum is likely to be available to the private plaintiff. Where such a
forum is available, the intensity of the conflict is not likely to be severe. This
potentiality prompted the courts in Mannington Mills and arguably in Tim-
berlane I to include the availability of an alternate forum in their lists of
balancing factors. 139 Yet, discussion of the issue is noticeably absent from
Timberlane III and the Revised Restatement.
140
135. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 950. S. 397 specifically contemplates solicitation by the
courts of such statements. See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
136. It should be emphasized that after remand from Timberlane 1, the action took nearly
seven years to reach the court of appeals a second time, arguably still limited to the issue of the
court's jurisdiction. S. 397's mandate for expedited treatment of motions to dismiss on jurisdic-
tional grounds would likely meet the same fate. Indeed, endorsing the position taken by the
Second Circuit in National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n,. 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir.
1981), Congress in adopting the 1982 amendment to section 7 of the Sherman Act indicated that
the "effect" necessary to establish jurisdiction "must be of the type that the antitrust laws
prohibit." H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 11 (1982). As a result, there will necessarily
be some overlap between the jurisdictional inquiry and the question of substantive anticompeti-
tive effect. See, e.g., Timberlane 111, 749 F.2d at 1384-85; Foreign Antitrust ImprovementAct of
1985: Hearings on S. 397 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(June 1985) (statement of Charles F. Rule, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, at 6) (expedited motion provisions not likely to be effective).
137. Cf. Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 1
(1984).
138. See, e.g., Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 936; Grippando, supra note 80, at 402 & n.32,
408-10. See generally M. Redish, supra note 119, at 233-58, 291-321.
139. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297 (factor 4); Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 614; Grip-
pando, supra note 2, at 408-10 & n.69.
140. Timberlane III, 749 F.2d at 1384; RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 403(2). S. 397 would
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Lastly, particularly with respect to the approach set forth by S. 397, there
is the danger of entangling the courts on the one hand, with Congress and
the Executive on the other by encouraging formal and informal contacts
between them concerning sensitive issues of foreign relations. The courts
should not become an international forum for lobbying in which the inquisi-
tor generally defers to the views of its patrons. The appearance of partiality
could placate or exacerbate foreign states, but most certainly would lessen
the independence of the courts.
III. Needed: Increased Political and Diplomatic, Not Judicial, Dialogue
Although the most recent wave of complaints concerning the scope of
U.S. antitrust jurisdiction arguably was triggered by private antitrust treble
damage actions, the response of foreign states has predictably been directed
at Congress and the Executive. Thus, debate has proceeded at the political
and diplomatic level between sovereigns, with some valuable results.
4 1
Arguably, the arena of international negotiation at the executive level is the
most appropriate avenue for resolution of the problems raised by concur-
rent prescriptive jurisdiction, where the laws or policies of the concerned
states collide. 142
To the extent the courts have a role to play in lessening the tensions likely
to arise in the context of international trade, traditional tools of comity and
equity are available to permit them to temper the impact of U.S. antitrust
jurisdiction at the discovery and remedial level.1 43 Continued use of these
tools while the broader issues of conflicting industrial and trade policies are
introduce the factor by codifying the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See note 112 and
accompanying text supra.
141. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Canada and the
Government of the United States of America as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation
With Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, Mar. 9, 1984, - U.S.T.
_,_ T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $ 50,464; Agreement on
Antitrust Cooperation, United States-Australia, June 29, 1982, - U.S.T. -,
T.I.A.S. No. 10365, reprinted in [1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,440;
Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, United
States - Federal Republic of Germany, June 23, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291,
reprinted in [1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,238. See also 2 ATWOOD &
BREWSTER, supra note 4, at 136-45; Note, The United States-Australian Antitrust Cooperation
Agreement: A Step in the Right Direction, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 127, 164-65 (1983).
142. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 33; Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, U.S.
Department of State Current Policy Bulletin No. 481 (Apr. 15, 1983); Remarks by Charles S.
Stark, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, Before the Annual Conference
of the Canadian Council on International Law (Oct. 21, 1983).
143. See, e.g., Fugate, supra note 11, at 63-65. One option that should be considered by
foreign firms doing business in the United States is the inclusion of an arbitration clause in all of
their contractual arrangements. The Supreme Court recently held that such clauses are enforce-
able even to the extent they require federal antitrust claims to be submitted to an international
arbitration panel. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 53 U.S.L.W. 5096
(U.S. July 2, 1985) (No. 83-1569).
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left to Congress and the Executive is more likely to place the courts in a
constructive role than would foisting upon them the role of grand inquisi-
tor-a role likely to embroil the courts in continued controversy. As sug-
gested by the Justice Department in its critique of S. 397, the courts can best
serve the interests of harmony in international trade by confining their
inquiries to the objective kinds of criteria with which they are familiar and at
their best-both constitutionally and by expertise.
144
144. Immediately prior to publications of this issue of THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER, Sen.
DeConcini introduced a "revised" version of S. 397. The new bill differs from the original ver-
sion as follows: (1) Sections 2(b), 3(b), and 5(b) of the bill would pemit the courts discretion to
allow merits discovery to proceed during the pendency of a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds; (2) Section 3 contains a list of suggested factors purportedly "purged" of political
considerations. Thus, the views of the Attorney General are no longer "required." However,
where the Attorney General "certifies" that an action will "interfere with the conduct" of
U.S. foreign relations, the court is required to dismiss the action; (3) Section 5, the detrebling
provision, has been altered to permit detrebling where a court determines that it would be more
reasonable for the action to proceed limited to compensatory damages and to authorize reten-
tion of treble damages where their elimination would impair U.S. antitrust enforcement inter-
ests; and (4) the bill expressly places U.S. and foreign nationals on equal ground as defendants
-dismissal or detrebling as to the foreign defendant(s) would require dismissal or detrebling as
to the U.S. defendant(s). For many of the reasons stated in our article, these revisions are in-
sufficient to resolve the problems raised by the original bill and indeed raise significant addi-
tional issues, both procedural and constitutional, including particularly the Attorney General's
"certification" authority.
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